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A Brief Review

Less a theory of human development than a philosophical approach, humanistic
psychology was organized in 1960 as a protest movement against the prevailing
behavioral approach to research and the near domination of clinical practice by
psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, humanistic psychology was heir to the more than
500-year history of efforts to stress the dignity and worth of the individual and the
capacity for self-realization through reason begun in the Enlightenment. At the
heart of the "disagreement" was the nature of the person, not necessarily the
assumptions inherent in the scientific enterprise. The new humanistic psychology
would emphasize conscious rather than unconscious determinants of behavior,
immediate rather than past experience, free will rather than conditioning,
individual uniqueness rather than determinism, motivation toward self-actualization
rather than tension reduction, and most importantly, the basic goodness of the
individual. Despite its seeming differences with the prevailing psychologies of its
time, humanistic psychology remained steadfastly positivist in its notions about the
perfectibility of the larger social order.
As one of its founders, Abraham Maslow (1968) described the basic assumptions
of this point of view as follows:

1.

We have, each of us, an essential biologically based inner nature,
which is to some degree "natural", intrinsic, given, and, in a
certain limited sense, unchangeable, or , at least, unchanging.

2.

Each person's inner nature is in part unique to himself and in part
species-wide.

3.

It is possible to study this inner nature scientifically and to
discover what it is like--(not invent--discover).

4.

This nature, as much as we know of it so far, seems not to be
intrinsically or primarily or necessarily evil. ...

5.

Since this inner nature is good or neutral rather than bad, it is
best to bring it out to encourage it rather than to suppress it.
If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful,
and happy.

6.

If this essential core of the person is denied or suppressed,
he gets sick sometimes in obvious ways, sometimes in subtle ways,
sometimes immediately, sometimes later.

7.

This inner nature is strong and overpowering and unmistakable
like the instincts of animals. It is weak and delicate and subtle
and easily overcome by habit, cultural pressure, and wrong
attitudes toward it.

8.

Even though weak, it rarely disappears in the normal person-perhaps
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not even in the sick person. Even though denied, it persists
underground forever pressing for actualization.
9.

Somehow, these conclusions must all be articulate with the
necessity of discipline, deprivation, frustration, pain, and tragedy.
To the extent that these experiences reveal and foster and fulfil our
inner nature, to that extent they are desirable experiences (pp. 34).

Basic to Maslow's own theory of personality was the hierarchy of needs through
which the individual must pass in efforts to become self-actualized, the presumed
endpoint of personal development. Only when lower order needs (physiological
and safety needs) are satisfied can one move on to the satisfaction of higher order
needs (belongingness and love, self-esteem, and self-actualization). In the final
revision of his hierarchy, Maslow added a level beyond self-actualization, called
"transcendence," or a surrender into an expanded sense of self. Maslow foresaw a
"transpersonal world view which transcends ego boundaries, sees all parts as being
equal in the whole, all humans as having the same needs, feelings and potentials"
(Hendricks & Weinhold, 1982, pp. 5-7).
Maslow's explication of a hierarchy of basic needs notwithstanding, his notion of a
drive toward self-actualization was mediated by a dialectic growth-fostering and
growth-discouraging forces. Consistently, he viewed culture as "sun and food and
water; it is not the seed" (1968, p. 161). As a consequence, efforts to humanize
the workplace from such a perspective have tended to encourage the leastrestrictive environment as being the one most encouraging of growth as a dynamic
process of self-actualization. Therefore, education (particular! y schooling) should
be directed to liberating these forces by removing environmental encumbrances
and encouraging freedom of choice. Critics have argued that freedom does not
necessarily lead to responsibility, however, especially to conditions set forth by the
larger society.

A Few Persistent Ironies
As humanistic psychology helped liberate individuals to feel they have more
freedom to choose the course of their personal destinies, ironically, people have
come to feel powerless in the face of overwhelming economic and social forces to
realize that course. As "empowerment" became the watchword of organization
restructuring in the past decade, people in systems found themselves more and
more powerless to effect necessary and wanted change (Glickman, Hayes &
Hensley, 1992). Rather than being empowered, Parry (1993) has noted "the
citizen of the modernist world is a powerless person with boundless desirers" (p.
436).
Despite its own efforts to put the child center stage for its particular form of
"social engineering," humanistic psychology has witnessed schools that continue to
cycle between the pillars of access and accountability (Glickman, 1990). Central
to the most recent school restructuring movement is the notion that those in
schools need to have greater control over the decisions that affect their lives
(Maeroff,
1988).
When given the opportunity to transcend their current
limitations, however, why do so many in schools find it so difficult to transcend
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what Maslow (1968) called the "psychopathology of the average" (p. 16)?
Maslow would argue that they choose safety over growth and that they would
spontaneously seek growth over safety were there safety assured. Creating a safe
environment, one must conclude from reading Maslow, leads naturally and
spontaneously to growth.
Few will disagree that the great accomplishment of modernity has been the
liberation of the individual. From the emergence of humanism as a philosophical
force in the 15th century into the present century, there developed a growing faith
that reality is One, that it is knowable, and that it is subject to "scientific"
observation. From this positivist position, one might claim that something is
"true" only if it corresponds to an independent, "objective" reality informed by the
methods of "science." Psychologists have disagreed, however, as to the basic
rules for establishing objectivity.
In spite of Maslow's (1968) own objections to the prevailing "impersonal science"
and the call to "construct a philosophy of science large enough to include
experiential knowledge" (p. 216), his own psychology lay embedded in the root
metaphors of a purely individualistic psychology. Nonetheless, Maslow believed
that "we must help the 'scientific' psychologists to realize that they are working on
the basis of a philosophy of science, not the philosophy of science, and that any
philosophy of science which serves primarily an excluding function is a set of
blinders, handicap rather than a help" [italics in original] (p. 218).
Most importantly, this press to find a universal truth amidst the proliferation of
voices has only exacerb'ated the spilt between theory and practice (Hoshmond &
Polkinghorne, 1993). Thoughtful consideration of the prospects for a "human
science" (Guba & Linclon, 1990; Howard, 1986) has lead psychologists to
challenge the basic assumptions underlying their own theory and practice. Many
(Caple, 1985; Gergen, 1991;
Hare-Mustin, 1988: Kimble, 1984; Polkinghorne, 1991; Scarr, 1985; Wilber,
1985; Zohar, 1990) argue that we are in the midst of a paradigmatic struggle that
is changing both the way that we conceptualize human functioning (theory) and the
way in which psychologists relate to their clients (practice). Like those in so
many disciplines before them, psychologists have begun to entertain the possibility
that modernism may have run its course.

The Postmodern Critique(s)
Although no single unifying alternative framework has yet arisen, there are several
confluent positions that are generally associated with a larger movement called
postmodernism. Originally a movement in literature, postmoderism, has been
given serious consideration by academics, professionals, and society at large. The
term is used to describe a set of confluent trends that are challenging the great
narratives of Western civilization (large-scale theoretical interpretations
purportedly of universal application). Instead, modernism is seen as one among
many possible narratives; empiricism is seen as an, rather than the, approach to
science (perrida, 1981; Foucault, 1972; Lyotard, 1983).
Postmodernism represents a general loss of faith in the modernist enterprise as
leading to the rational planning of an ideal social order and the consequent

31

standardization of knowledge and production.
Instead, postmodernists favor
"heterogeneity and difference as Iiberative forces in the redefinition of cultural
discourse' (PRECIS, 1987). Fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of
all universal or totalizing "discourses" (to use Foucault's term) are the hallmark of
postmodern thought. In particular, postmodernists reject the pictorial (iconic)
metaphor of knowledge in favor of a constructivist (architectural) metaphor
(Lyotard, 1983).
At the end of the 19th century, psychology emerged from its dependence upon
either physiology or philosophy to adopt its own particular forms for explaining
human behavior (Loevinger, 1987). Despite the resulting proliferation of theories
(e.g.
psychodynamic,
behavioral,
social
learning,
cognitive-behavioral,
psychometric, or person-centered), observers (Allport, 1962; Gardner, 1978;
Gergen, 1991; Gibbs, 1979; Hempel, 1966; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1973; Langer,
1969, Sanrey, Kohlberg, & Noam, 1983) have argued that these "separate"
approaches share a basic ontological assumption about the a priori nature of
reality. Maslow's approach among them, they remain steadfastly positivist; they
differ about where to search for the source of certainty and coherence in human
functioning--in the environment or within the person.
It is the argument of the postmodernists that the near total focus of the modernist
enterprise upon individual freedom has obviated attention to the larger social
context within which such changes were taking place.
Thus, from an
epistemological-metaphysical perspective, postmodernism suggests that the courses
of our uncertainty should be systematically exposed and that the~e be a
restructuring of the inte1Iectual life in order to attend fully to the meaning of a
lack of secure intellectual markers.
Despite Maslow's rather bold claims for the emergency of a fourth psychology to
add to the psychodynamic, behavioral, and humanistic, he failed to recognise the
significance of yet another psychology. Near the turn of the century, Baldwin
(1902/1897), Cooley (1902), Dewey (1896), James (1890), and Mead (1934)
argued that it is logically impossible to establish the "truth" of any particular piece
of knowledge, no matter where one looks for the answer. Because each claim to
know the truth is itself subject to comparison with yet another claim, we never get
to see the constraints of the world with which our enterprise collides. Instead,
what we experience, and thus come to know, is necessarily built up of our own
building blocks and can be explained in no other way than in terms of ours ways
and means for building. In this sense, reality is what you make it.
This perspective, now widely referred to as constructivist (Hayes, 1994), asserts
that we do not discover reality, rather we invent it (Watzlawick, 1984). Unlike
Maslow's developmental psychology, the constructivist proposes an epistemic
notion of reality as constructed--of an experiential world that makes no claim
whatsoever about truth in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality.
Rather, what is "known" cannot be the result of a passive receiving nor selfdiscovery, but originates as the product of the "activity of the knower."
Further, something which has already been experienced will be put together in
relationship with subsequent experience to give rise to one of two concepts:
similarity or difference. In this way the concepts of equivalence and individual
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identity are built up over time through successive experiences. This notion of the
self as a self-organizing system has profound implications for understanding
human development and, in turn, for reconceptualizing counselling as something
other than psychotherapy (Carlsen, 1988; Friedman, 1933; Goodman, 1984;
Hayes, in press; Howard & Orlinsky, 1972; Ivey, 1986; Kegan, 1982; Kvale,
1992; Mahoney, 1985; Saari, 1991).

Constructivism and Human Development
Although the basic tenets for a truly constructivist developmental psychology can
be found in the work of many of those noted previously, especially that of James
Mark Baldwin (1902), it is to the genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget (1924,
1936/1954, 1926/1955) that one must turn to tind its most explicit expression.
According to Piaget, humans inherit two basic functions: organization and
adaptation. Organization refers to the tendency for all living things to attempt to
order their processes; in effect, organisms organize. Once experienced, this object
is brought into our awareness as a part of the way we think.
As Piaget (1937)
explained: "Intelligence organizes the world by organizing itself" (p. 311). Thus,
we learn through our experience with objects.
The second function is the tendency of living things to make modifications in
response to changing environmental conditions in anticipation of desired outcomes.
The test of truth, therefore, is not correspondence with Reality, but rather
viability. As von Glasersfeld (1991) put the issue, "What matters is not to match
the world, but to fit into it in spite of whatever obstacles or traps it might present"
[italics in original] (p 16).
Piaget's constructivist framework has been elaborated further into developmental
models that describe a progression of meaning-making structures in a variety of
domains in addition to cognition. The study of dialectical thinking by Basseches
(1984), moral reasoning by Kohlberg (1969, 1981), cognition by Bruner (1986),
social perspective taking by Selman (1980), ego development by Loevinger (1976)
reflective judgment by Kitchener and King (1981), intellectual and ethical
development by Perry (1970), and self-development by Kegan (1982) have all
relied heavily upon Piaget's work. Although equal credit must be shared with
Baldwin, Piaget also had a major influence upon Vygotsky's (1962) otherwise very
original work in language development. Recently, Ivey (1986), Leva (1984),
Noam (1988), Rosen (1985) and Weiner, (1985) have each made deliberate
attempts to fashion a constructivist developmental therapy model based on Piaget.
While Piaget and his adherents focussed their attention upon theory construction in
human development, clinicians were independently elaborating constructivist
models of therapy. Although the works of Alfred Adler (1926/1972), Harry Stack
Sullivan (1953), and the object relations theorists (St Clair, 1986) point in the
general direction of a constructivist therapy model, perhaps only George Kelly's
(1955) psychology of personal constructs satisfies our current understanding of a
constructivist approach. Today the list can be expanded to include Arbib and
Hes.se (1986), Goodman (1984), Guidano (1987), Mahoney (1990), and
Watzlawick (1984) in addition to those neo-Piagetians mentioned above.
Space does not permit a full explication of the similarities among and the
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differences between each of these approaches here. Nonetheless, they all share the
basic constructivist perspective that humans actively create their own particular
reality. More specifically, they share the assumptions that:
1.

Individuals are active agents in their own development.

2.

Cognition is an active relating of events such that what
one knows emerges in the light of interactions between certain
organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the
outside world (Kelly, 1955: Piaget, 1960).

3.

Reality is constructed from experience. In the process of
organizing one's experience, the individual must simultaneously
assimilate novel experiences into pre-existing structures and
accommodate pre-existing structures to meet the demands
presented by new experiences (Baldwin, 1902; Piaget, 1960).

4.

Development is contextual; it takes place in a social context.
The process of knowing emerges in the light of transactions
between ourselves and out personal surroundings (Basseches,
1984; Gibbs, 1979; Mead, 1934).

5.

Because people make meaning within the context of their own
understanding, the telling of one's own life history is more
fabrication that recreation (Howard, 1989; Noam, 1988).
Consistent with the postmodern critique, each person's life
can be viewed as its own grand narrative (Gergen & Gergen,
1988; Howard, 1989).

6.

Development is a qualitative reorganization of meaning. Each
person's self-regulating system emerges as a consequence of new
states of equilibrium that were created by the previous
self-regulatory system. Therefore, disequilibration serves as
a stimulus to development, while equilibration is its goal (Langer,
1969, pp. 95-96).

7.

Developmental stages refer to "qualitative [ita! ics in original]
differences in children's modes of thinking or of solving problems
at different ages" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 352). Each of these stages
provides a "structured whole" (Piaget, 1960, p. 14) that represents
an individual world view or frame of reference for meaningmaking. Each succeeding stage represents the capacity to make
sense of a greater variety of experience in a more adequate way.
Thus, each stage is a more differentiated, comprehensive, and
integrated structure than the one before it.

8.

Development is understood as successively more complex attempts
to make meaning of the facts of one's social experience. The
fundamental reason for movement from one stage to the next is
that a latter stage is more adequate in some universal sense than an
earlier stage. The basic notion of this stage concept
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leads to the conceptualization of development as the movement
toward greater adaptation, differentiation, and integration of
distinct modes of thought in a universal, invariant, and hierarchical
developmental sequence (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1960; Werner,
1940/1973).

Reconstructing Maslow's Hierarchy
As argued above, Maslow's own search for a personal science and his faith in a
transpersonal psychology notwithstanding, he failed to transcend the limitations of
his own developmental psychology.
Likewise, he failed to grasp fully the
implications of a constructivist psychology emerging before him. Indeed, it is a
line of thought that Maslow (1968) complained "I wouldn't take seriously were it
not that so many others do take it seriously" (p. 180). Continuing, he noted that
this "Harry Stack Sullivan type of effort to define a Self simply in terns of what
other people think of him [is] an extreme cultural relativity in which a healthy
individuality gets lost altogether. With these comments, Maslow dismissed a
transactive social psychological development of the self as nothing more than to
"define the Self simply in terms of what other people think" (p180).
More recent transpersonal psychologies have not failed to appreciate the
significance of this perspective. In particular, the work of Ken Wilber (1980,
1983) relies upon constructivist development paradigms that pose a dialectic
between the self and a social environment such that the self is constructed rather
than elaborated (i.e., evolved) over time. From this view, contradiction and
conflict are the impetus' to development. It is the confrontation of the self and
environment rather than the subservience of environment to self that fosters
development. In the context of schooling, the constructivist argues that true
development arises only in the context of challenge by the environment.
In reconstructing Maslow's hierarchy, therefore, each stage can be viewed as
creating the awareness of specific needs and as possessing the capability for
responding to such needs. Thus motivation is not clue to need deprivation but
rather to anticipation of satisfying needs as yet unrealized.
Higher stages
represent expaqded opportunities for choice. Higher stages emerge through lower
stages rather than as a consequence of their satisfaction. The transpersonal, rather
than emerging from an awareness of more basic core personality variables,
represents a transcendence of the person as the basis for self-construction. It is a
level at which interindividuality and the interpenetrability of self systems has
become the content for a higher structure of self.

Implications
At the outset of this article, Maslow was quoted as asking how to set up social
conditions in any organization so that the goals of the individual merge with the
goals of the organization. It has been suggested that the difficulty for Maslow in
answering his own question lay in his acceptance of a dichotomy between the
needs of the individual and the society. Additionally, it has been argued that his
difficulties were exacerbated by his reliance upon a positivist developmental
psychology.
A modification to Maslow's hierarchy has been suggested that
permits an understanding of individual human development as a transactive social
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process that expands rather than merely displaces previous modes of functioning.
Accepting this constructivist reinterpretation of Maslow's hierarchy pojnts the way
to a set of implications for conceptualizing developmental intervention in education
and counseling.
The primary implication of this self-constructive view of reality is that
development is essentially the task of mastering the facts of one's existence. The
focus of teaching, therefore, would not be on students as human beings as much as
it is on students as humans being. It is to the student's struggle to understand the
self and others, therefore, in the context of a shared social experience, that
constructivist educators turn there attention.
The central implication of this constructivist account for teaching is that students
construct reality through their experience. Thus the student's reality represents a
relationship between the student and the world as the student understands that
world. It is not so much that students have problems as that they experience
problems, for how one understands and makes meaning of experience betrays the
underlying logic of how one makes sense of one's own existence. Understanding
cognition as an active relating of events shifts the object of study from cognitions
to the cognitive process itself. As Mahoney and Lycldon (1988) have explained:
Central to the constructivist formulations is the idea that, rather
than being a short of template through which on going experience
is filtered, the representational model [of the individual] actively
creates [italics in original] and constrains new experience and thus
determines whanhe individual will perceive as "reality" (p. 200).
From a constructivist perspective, educators should be less concerned with what
students believe to be true, or with why they believe it, and more with how they
came to believe it. Consequently, educators should shift their attention from
changing what students believe, or from helping them to uncover the reasons why,
to varying the process by which students arrive at those beliefs.
True
understanding combines knowledge with felt experience.
If personality development is essentially the universal, ongoing process of meaning
making, then education should focus on development and the person's experience
of this process. The implication of this model for understanding cognitive
development is that individuals within a particular stage of development view
reality in ways that are similar with regard to structure but may be vastly different
with regard to content. In this way, each level of cognitive development might be
viewed as a culture of cognitive structure.
If we understand the person's history as the construction of a personal social
narrative, then all actions are essentially incomplete, susceptible to limitless
interpretations by ever-more imaginative interpreters. Therefore,the test of truth,
as noted earlier, is pragmatic--it is the viability or practical utility of knowledge
that makes it "true."
From a constructivist perspective, the person serves as his or her own historian in
confronting the past either as menacing and unknown or as an organizing
framework of thought and feeling that needs to be assimilated into present
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structures. The implication of this perspective is that education should create a
social context for reconstruction--an expansion across the life history of what
Winnicott, referring to the infant, called the "holding environment" (Kegan, 1982,
p. 256) .
.. The most important aspect of a constructivist view of how we think is that
experience is the necessary condition for development, although experience itself
is not enough. Because we tend both to organize and adapt, we must necessarily
interact with the environment. Thus, each person's experience must be of a kind
that presents genuine cognitive conflict for him or her. Rather than minimize
conflict, the constructivist encourages conditions that present a discrepancy to
some optimal extent between the student's existing mental structures and the
student's present experience.
Thus, teaching from a constructivist perspective looks more like a dialogue than a
lecture or even an interview. It is a dialogue between the student's structures and
the structures of the environment, where the educator may be understood as one of
many elements in that environment (Gergen, 1991).
Within the context of
counseling, in taking the perspective of the counselor as audience to the client, the
client experiences him or herself in new and potentially more growthful ways.

If we understand that development is a liberating function in that it expands the
basis upon which our present reality is constructed, then we should seek those
social relationships that will support such expansion/liberation most fully. Rather
than being a powerless person with boundless desires, the postmoclern individual is
an empowered person with bounded desires--bounded by the realization that his or
her present understanding is necessarily limited but, having realized the nature of
his or her own construction, the individual is empowered to change that world.
The notion that a person's construction of reality is constrained both by past
experience and existing structures leads to the conclusion that individual
knowledge is necessarily incomplete. As a consequence, it is very cliftlcult to be
certain one knows the truth even if a knowledge of truth were possible. The
impossibility of objective reality supports continual expansion of forums for
democratic de.cision making to enable new possibilities to become crystallized and
to get acted upon.
The constructivist's recogmtton of the social construction of discourse on the
world (Gergen, 1991) points to the problem inherent in negotiated understandings
across the boundaries of race, gender, ethnicity, culture, or personal experience.
The realization that neither problems nor solutions are ontologically "correct," is
the consequence of recognizing that our particular realities are self constructions.
Recognizing that deficiencies in the other are more appropriately understood as
one's own construction of the other makes the individual more tolerant. Put in
other words, intolerance of others is actually intolerance of oneself.
To promote tolerance, constructivism encourages the development of a language of
dif[erence that would permit one to understand the other as the self, recognizing
the inseparability of our knowledge of one another.
As argued by Dewey
(1916/1944): "A democracy is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint
communicated experience" (p. 87).
What Dewey is saying is that democracy
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begins in ·conversation because in conversation one must take the other into
account. Because both self and other are changing within a changing social
context, neither self-development nor the consequent demand for conversation are
necessarily complete.
Faced with the recurring possibility of error, the individual must engage in a
process of continual self-reflection.
Because the problems encountered by
professional practitioners are frequently complex, Schon (1987) has argued that
professional education should be centered on enhancing the practitioner's ability
for "refleCtion-in-action." Set within a democratic social structure, the selfreflective practitioner will act as a collaborator in the solution of real world
problems that demand mutual understanding among all group members.
Recognizing social interaction as a self-constructive act, educators and their
students who engage one another in the satisfaction of mutually-determined goals
will do nothing less than promote their own self-development.
To resolve
Maslow's management problem of setting up "social conditions in any
organization so that the goals of the individual merge with the goals of the
organization," one need recast the question. Rather than set conditions that reveal,
foster, and fulfil our inner nature, for which Maslow argued, the constructivist
engages the other (whether student, client, or colleague) fully in negotiating the
very conditions to be set in realizing mutually-determined goals.
As a
consequence, the conditions for a truly Eupsychian workplace lie in the process of
moving toward becoming one world rather in the realization of such an event.

In Conclusion
As noted above, constructivist educators will want to focus more on present
understandings in the service of future actions than on past actions in the service
of present understandings. In attempts to understand students' present efforts at
making meaning, educators should focus on the interaction between students and
their present environments, recognizing themselves and the contents of their
students' own narratives as objects in that social environment.
Thus, the
constructivist educator attempts to provide a holding environment for facilitating
the student's development by acknowledging the student's reality and by
supporting the student's efforts to restore some balance to the world as the student
knows it.
The implications of meeting the challenge of a postmoclern world from a
constructivist perspective is that teachers and counselors should become
developmental educators who are involved in the development of deliberate
democratic institutions. The expansion of the self as a meaning making system
should be the proper aim of a truly developmental education. By becoming
developmental educators within a deliberate democratic community, teachers who
take a constructivist approach will accept the challenge to empower students to
work together to realize communities of their own making (Hayes, 1993).
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